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Abstract
Law is – and has long been – a crucial element of (post-) colonial orders. It is commonplace wisdom that
the Western centre dominates the eastern periphery, not only through outright force but also via
institutions and ideas. Europeans and Americans have a long history of bringing ‘civilisation,’ be it
Christianity, ‘modernity’ or law, to peoples they perceive as less civilised. Despite the common practice of
applying different rules to different peoples, colonisers often see the lack of uniformity of law in the
colonies as a failure, if not a necessary evil, for the ‘uncivilised’ colonised native. For countries that
narrowly escaped subjugation to Euro-American colonialism, such as China and Japan, the sentiment of
the humiliation endured when being forced to ‘openup’ and adopt Western legal systems is still very much
alive.
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‘Rule of Law’ as Anti-Colonial Discourse:
Taiwanese Liberal Nationalists’
Imagination of Nation and World
under Japanese Colonialism
Yun-Ru Chen
Taiwan is part of the world. The Taiwanese are members of the human
race. The people on this island cannot remain isolated from the spirit
of the modern world. Instead, we shall make amends while there is
time and catch up with the modern age. We shall not only enlighten
ourselves on the new spiritual and material culture but also contribute
to the grander project of reforming the world (Lin 1922b: 36-37).

Introduction
Law is – and has long been – a crucial element of (post-) colonial
orders. It is commonplace wisdom that the Western centre dominates
the eastern periphery, not only through outright force but also via
institutions and ideas. Europeans and Americans have a long history of
bringing ‘civilisation,’ be it Christianity, ‘modernity’ or law, to peoples
they perceive as less civilised. Despite the common practice of applying
different rules to different peoples, colonisers often see the lack of
uniformity of law in the colonies as a failure, if not a necessary evil, for
the ‘uncivilised’ colonised native. For countries that narrowly escaped
subjugation to Euro-American colonialism, such as China and Japan,
the sentiment of the humiliation endured when being forced to ‘openup’ and adopt Western legal systems is still very much alive.
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Many postcolonial nationalists include ‘rule of law’ and liberal
political traditions as parts of the ‘white mythology’ that perpetuates
Western supremacy and therefore sustains colonial domination (Baxi
2011). In the ‘Asian values’ debate, ex-prime minister Lee Kuan
Yew of Singapore asserts that constitutional democracy and human
rights are nurtured in the West and are thus incompatible with Asian
societies (Engle 2002; Goodroad 1998: 261). This concept of pan-Asia
commonalities contrasted with perceived Euro-American ideas of
universalism withered away after the 1997 Asia Financial Crisis. Yet,
recently, in a similar vein, China and Russia support the idea of a unique
legal and political culture and understand themselves as defending
their identity from the encroachment of Western imperialism and its
liberal tendencies.

By associating the unique characteristics of their people, be they
‘Asian-ness’, ‘Chinese-ness’, or ‘Russian-ness’ with conservative
values, authoritarian leaders present themselves as defending against
the encroachment of Western imperialism and its individualistic
tendencies. Authoritarian governments often understand ‘rule of law’
as mainly, if not purely, formal and do not shy away from deploying
law as a tool with which to suppress dissidents (Tamanaha 2004: 3).
Nationalists who advocate for liberal democracy therefore often find
themselves trapped in the identity debate.
This article presents a departure from the pattern described above by
analysing nationalist discourse a cluster of ideas—nation, culture, and
law—within the anticolonial nationalist discourse in Japan-colonized
Taiwan (1895-1945). The majority of the texts that I will discuss were
written by Lin Cheng-Lu (1886-1968), a Taiwanese lawyer and activist/
journalist, in his capacity as editor-in-chief of a polemical magazine,
The Taiwan Youth (Tâi Oân Chheng Liân台灣青年, which was changed
into Taiwan Tâi Oân台灣 in 1922), a polemical magazine in colonial
Taiwan. This article shows that the 1920s-era Taiwanese nationalists’
concept of ‘rule of law’ was characterized by its liberal tendency. It
revolved around not only formal values, such as government legality,
but also democracy and the protection of individual rights, arguably
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‘the defining characteristic of Western political tradition’ (Tamanaha
2004: 2).

Taiwanese nationalists presented ‘rule of law’, along with other
liberal ideas circulated among post–WWI cosmopolitan elites around
the world, as a necessary part of both Taiwan’s emergence into the
international ‘world’, and of Taiwan’s struggle against Japanese
subjugation. From the perspective of nation-building, 'rule of law' was
presented as a requisite for the Taiwanese becoming a 'people (volk)'
and becoming part of the international world. In Lin’s nationalist
construction of the history of Taiwan and its people, the Taiwanese were
a people isolated in a corner of the world and falling behind. ‘Rule of law’
and other core ideas Lin proposed for the ‘new culture’ were presented as
essential values that the Taiwanese needed to adopt in order to qualify
themselves to join the world. Furthermore, Taiwanese nationalists
deployed the rhetoric of ‘rule of law’ to criticize the Japanese, who were
still struggling to prove themselves a ‘civilized’ country to the Western
world. Lin condemned the denial of political rights for the Taiwanese,
which, according to him, was a sign of antiquated colonial rule. Lin’s
belief in ‘rule of law’ for his own people and his critique of Japanese
rule were in fact two sides of the same coin.
In the following sections are as follows. I will first provide
background information about Lin Cheng-Lu and the context into
which he was writing. I will highlight the opportunities and limitations
Lin faced under colonial rule, which were exemplified by his education
and his career in various institutions of colonial Taiwan. The main
goal of this discussion is to show the common feeling of segregation
and restriction shared by the Taiwanese colonial elite, which not only
created a sense of a community but also mirrored their desire to ‘join
the world’ and embrace liberal democracy.
Next, I will investigate Lin’s writings, which constructed and
characterised the Taiwanese nation under colonial rule. I will use
primary source materials, such as Lin’s writings as the editor of The
Taiwan Youth, to do so. Compared to other articles Lin wrote as a
theorist – most of which were to demand the creation of a colonial
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parliament in Taiwan under the Japanese Constitution – the articles
discussed here reveal a sometimes sentimental view of Taiwanese
nationalism. Addressed mainly to Lin’s fellow Taiwanese intellectuals,
Lin’s writings vividly reveal a mentality of feeling excluded from the
oriental and regional colonial empire, and an anxiousness to exist, to
be recognised, and to participate in the international society.

Ultimately, this article proposes that nationalism does not
necessarily play a reactionary role in law and politics. It suggests that
we understand Taiwanese’s pursuit of autonomy then and now as a civic
and internationalist nationalism that went hand in hand with a liberal
understanding of ‘rule of law’.
1 The Stage: The Taiwanese Nationalist Movement, Lin
Cheng-Lu and The Taiwan Youth

Figure 1: The first issue of The Taiwan Youth

The Taiwan Youth was first published in 1920 in the aftermath of
the First World War. Echoing Woodrow Wilson’s wartime rhetoric,
colonised and stateless peoples in the Middle East and Asia demanded
self-determination. Although China had never formally been under
any colonial rule, it had been forced to sign a series of ‘unequal treaties’
with foreign powers since the mid-nineteenth century. Many Chinese
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intellectuals saw an unprecedented opportunity in the Allied victory
and in the subsequent peace conference in Paris for China to pursue
the goal of attaining an equal status among the nations. In March
1919, just a few months before The Taiwan Youth was founded, Korean
nationalists also seized the moment and launched a popular movement
again Japan’s colonial rule in Seoul (Manela 2007).

The first publication of The Taiwan Youth coincided with the
beginnings of nationalism in Taiwan. While China had been the
great power in East Asia for centuries, Japan’s unexpected victory over
China in the first Sino-Japanese war (1894) transformed power politics
in the region and beyond. Emerging as a world power, Japan acquired
Taiwan as a trophy and its first colony. In the 1910s and 1920s, modern
Taiwanese intellectuals emerged. Two decades of colonial rule had
produced a generation of bilingual elites who were fluent in their
mother tongues, be it Taiwanese or Hakka, as well as in Japanese.
Like young Chinese, Korean, Arabs and many others, many Taiwanese
youth became nationalists through their own lived colonial experience.
Lin Cheng-Lu’s personal journey provides helpful background
information for this analysis. Lin founded The Taiwan Youth, the first
Taiwanese polemical press, during the colonial era and served as its
chief editor for the next two decades. Though he held a law degree
from Tokyo’s Meiji Law School, Lin considered himself primarily an
activist journalist. As a theorist of the nationalists’ movement, Lin
produced numerous works advocating political and legal reforms in
colonial Taiwan, including the ones discussed in this article.
A Becoming a Cosmopolitan Nationalist: The Journey of Lin
Cheng-Lu
Lin was born to a Han-Chinese family in late nineteenth-century
Taiwan, an island frontier of the Qing Empire. Lin’s family had
immigrated from Fujian, a southeastern coastal province of China and
settled in Taiwan, farming for living for several generations. According
to Lin, his father also managed farmland for the absentee landlord and
served as a leader in the local area.
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Lin studied in traditional Chinese-style private schools with
schoolmasters for several years; through his studies Lin mastered
Chinese archaic literary styles and classical works. In 1895, the first
Sino-Japanese war made Lin a colonial subject of the emerging Japanese
Empire. In 1896, when Japanese troops approached Lin’s hometown
to suppress an armed resistance, Lin’s father represented the villagers
to negotiate with the Japanese military in hopes of a peaceful political
transition. However, Lin’s father and one older brother were killed
as the Japanese army slaughtered civilians, and the family home was
burned to the ground. Fleeing from their hometown to the other side
of the Taiwan Strait, Lin Cheng-Lu and his mother stayed in Fujian
for a few months before returning to Taiwan (Wang, 1991: 24-25).
The expansion of the Japanese Empire to include Taiwan was not
only a catastrophe for Lin’s family but also imposed a subordinate status
of ‘the colonised’ on Lin and all residents of this island. However, it
was in this colonial context that Lin Cheng-Lu became a nationalist
and a cosmopolitan intellectual. Lin’s two portraits below reveal his
transformation.

Figure 2A: 1910

Figure 2B: 1920

Examining the microfilm a century later, the black-and-white
picture (Figure 2A) of a young Lin, although blurred by time, vividly
captures his colonial background. The half-length portrait was taken
before 1910, when Lin was a normal school graduate and a clerk in the
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colonial court. His attire is the best illustration of his cultural hybridity.
Here, Lin wears student uniform derived from Prussian army uniforms
and adopted nationwide in Meiji Japan for male students. Meanwhile,
he wore a queue, a hairstyle common to Chinese men from the Qing
dynasty. The second photo, taken in the 1920s (Figure 2B) shows Lin’s
further transformation; it is once again an example of multilevel cultural
transplants. Here, Lin adopts the hairstyle and outfit that Japanese
modern intellectuals imitated from their Euro-American counterparts.
As will be discussed later, Lin acquired his knowledge of modern law
and politics in a similar way.

Colonial rule gave young Taiwanese an opportunity to rise up;
however, it also imposed limitations upon them. By the age of 14,
Lin entered the double-track colonial education system as a student
at a ‘common school,’ the elementary school for Taiwanese pupils.
The other track was the ‘primary school,’ which was mainly reserved
for Japanese children. When Lin graduated in 1905, there were not
many opportunities for either advanced education or suitable jobs for
common school graduates. Luckily, through a highly competitive
entrance exam, he matriculated at the Japanese Language School in
Taipei, the capital of colonial Taiwan, from which he graduated summa
cum laude (Wang, 1991: 25).
Between Lin’s graduation and his departure for Tokyo in 1914, he
appears to have been somewhat disoriented. He worked as a clerk at
the Bank of Taiwan, which was set up by the colonial government to
facilitate capital investment in Taiwan by Japanese corporations. Lin’s
salary was half that of his Japanese colleagues, typical for the time.
Still, for a young Taiwanese individual, a job at the Bank of Taiwan
was considered a rare accomplishment. Yet he did not stay long. A few
months later, Lin worked as a common school teacher for a year or so
in his hometown. Then he resigned and worked at the Taipei District
Court as a non-permanent employee. Meanwhile, he self-studied law
for the common civil service examination, the ladder for high-school
graduates to enter the colonial bureaucracy as low-level civil servants
(Wang, 1991: 25).
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Many colonial Taiwanese youth could relate to Lin’s restlessness.
In a Japanese-language novel published almost 20 years later (The Town
with Papaya Trees: 1937), the leading character, Chen Yo-San, is an
ambitious Taiwanese high-school graduate. While Chen is paid a lower
salary than his Japanese colleagues as an accountant-clerk in a small
town hall, he is preparing for the Common Civil Service Examination
with the hope of rising in the world. The author, Long Ying-Zong
(1911-1999), was a vocational school graduate and also once worked at
the Bank of Taiwan. Defeated by a hopeless love and the suffocating
atmosphere in the colony, the fictional character Chen Yo-San gave up
his ambitions in despair. In contrast, our main character, Lin, passed the
civil service examination and became the only Taiwanese civil servant
in the Taipei District Court.

Writing in the developing vernacular Chinese, a reporter in Taiwan
Daily Newspaper, presumably a Taiwanese, described Lin as ‘an up-andcoming youngster … of few words yet full of talent’. Overjoyed by the
fact that Lin got the highest grade among all the examinees, outshining
all the Japanese examinees, the reporter concluded for his Taiwanese
readers that Lin’s and other Taiwanese youths’ accomplishments
signified the increase of Taiwanese intellectuals with modern knowledge
(July 23 1910). Ironically, in ten years this diligent and well-behaved
young man ‘of few words’ would become one of the most outspoken
activists for the anti-colonial movement in both Taiwan and Japan.

Lin’s story was also covered in the Monthly Law Report (Hōin Geppō),
a legal journal issued by the High Court of Governor-General of Taiwan
and circulated in the colonial legal circles. Similar to the Taiwan Daily
Newspaper story, this report extrapolated signs of the emergence of the
modern Taiwanese intellectual from Lin’s success. Lin was praised for
his diligent study of law and his achievement. However, rather than
being unreservedly proud of his fellow countryman, the writer here,
presumably a Japanese colonial lawyer, cautiously observed the trend of
emerging Taiwanese youth, the ‘others,’ so to speak, who were capable
of competing with, or, in Lin’s case, besting the Japanese (Anonymous
1910b: 151-152).
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In a matter-of-fact style, the Monthly Law Report author stated
that the ‘islanders’ were on the one hand ‘reactionary, stubborn’ and
hopelessly ‘uninstructed,’ and on the other hand, that they were a people
who were ‘influenced by Confucianism with great literary tradition’
and that, therefore, the Japanese should not regard them with scorn.
In other words, what this author presents is not simply an inspirational
story. The intended lesson was, for the author’s Japanese colleagues,
mainly a warning against treating the seemingly backward Taiwanese
lightly. The Taiwanese were presented as a people who were primitive;
however, they were also a people who were intelligent and ambitious and
therefore threatening. This contradictory portrait nicely summarises
colonial rhetoric toward the native: The colonised were too backward
to be treated equally, but at the same time, too smart to be taken lightly
(Anonymous 1910b: 151-152).
In his retrospective interview, Lin seemed proud of being a
Taiwanese pioneer in modern Japan officialdom (Wang 1991: 25-26).
Most parents of that era, whether Taiwanese or Japanese, would have
been proud of what their son had accomplished in his case. At the
same time, while receiving due respect as a civil officer, Lin watched
painfully as his Japanese colleagues called other Taiwanese natives
or Chinese ruffians (Wang 1991: 25-26). Furthermore, one of Lin’s
contemporaries mentioned that Lin was discriminated against in the
Taipei District Court and was appointed to positions inferior to those
held by Japanese with equivalent credentials. It was suggested that
such unfair treatment was the reason for Lin’s later resignation from
the Taipei District Court (Huang et al 1991: 281). Lin’s long-awaited
trip for advanced legal studies in Japan was another.

In 1914, Lin departed Taipei to go to Tokyo, where he lived
until 1926. Given the phenomenon of colonised youth everywhere
traveling in flocks to the respective centres of their empires, be it
London for Indians or Paris for Vietnamese, it is not a surprise to see
Lin’s pilgrimage to Tokyo. Judging from his transcript, Lin was just
an ordinary law student.1 The courses he took, including obligation
(rights in personam), inheritance, private international law, and civil
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procedure, were typical courses offered in a modern law school. Like
any other ambitious law student in Japan, Lin prepared for the highly
competitive judicial exam after graduation.

However, rather than becoming a jurist or bureaucrat, Lin got
involved in the nationalist movement. His journey to Japan greatly
strengthened his passion for activism. Lin remained in Tokyo during
the era of the liberal movement known as ‘Taishō Democracy’ (19121926). Calls were raised for universal male suffrage, recognition of
labour union, and genuine constitutionalism. In Meiji Law School,
known for its liberal traditions and for producing Japanese civil rights
activists, student organisations and movements mushroomed. Campus
riots from both the left and the right happened from time to time.

It was also a moment of internationalism in Japan. The Paris Peace
Conference in 1919 following World War I gave birth to the League
of Nations. Japan joined the organisation in 1920 and was active in
League as a permanent members of the League of Nations Council
until its withdrawal in 1933. The Japanese liberal intellectuals, including
academic, labour, and religious leaders, called for democracy and
pacifism. Yoshino Sakuzo (1878-1933), a Tokyo University Professor,
warned that Japan could no longer stay isolated from the global society
and advocated democratising reforms, which would enable ‘a special
mission for Japan on the world stage’(Burkman 1983: 24-26). That was,
to shepherd the nations in the world to progress. The ideas of ‘catching
up’ with the trend of the world were not only ubiquitous in the rhetoric
of the Taishō Democrats, as I will show later, these terms also presented
the main theme of Lin Cheng-Lu’s articles.
At that time, Tokyo was a nexus for young nationalists from Korea,
China, and Taiwan. Partly due its liberal-oriented faculty in the
studies of colonial policy and international relations, Meiji Law School
was the most welcoming to foreign students among the professional
schools. Many Taiwanese students pursued their advanced education
there (Wakabayashi 2011: 33). Lin was a frequent visitor to the Young
Chinese Christian Association in Tokyo and kept in close contact with
its leaders (Tsai and Shie 1983: 157). According to a report prepared by
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the Japanese secret police force whose main mission was to investigate
and control political activists, Lin and several other Taiwanese students
co-founded a group called ‘Echoing Association’ with Chinese students
in Tokyo in 1919 (Taiwan Shiryō Hozonkai 1969: 24-25).

As mentioned earlier, 1919 was the year that Korean nationalism
attained its greatest momentum. Lin’s close association with the leader
of young Korean nationalists in Tokyo was also recorded in this report.
Lin frequently contributed to a mouthpiece of the Korean nationalist
movement called The Korea Youth, a name analogous to The Taiwan
Youth (Taiwan Shiryō Hozonkai 1969: 24-25).
B The Text: The Taiwan Youth and Taiwan (Formosa)
Founded in 1920, The Taiwan Youth marked the emergence of modern
Taiwanese nationalism. It was the product of a joint effort between
two groups. One was the rising modern intelligentsia, particularly the
Taiwanese students in Tokyo. These bilingual young Taiwanese men
developed an alliance with the second group, which was the indigenous
and landowning elites, the traditional Taiwanese intellectuals. One
such example of the latter group is Lin Hsien-Tang (1881-1956),2
a widely known and respected Taiwanese landlord and businessman
who financially supported the first group. In the spring of 1919, these
two groups gathered in Tokyo for the inaugural meeting of the New
People’s Association, the first political organisation of the Taiwanese
movement. They agreed to publish a periodical to serve as an organ for
the movement.

The Taiwan Youth was the very first periodical run by Taiwanese
activist-journalists, many of whom went on to found Taiwan People’s
Daily, the most influential polemical newspaper in colonial Taiwan.
The Taiwan Youth was a bilingual monthly magazine, with most of the
articles written in or translated into both Japanese and Chinese. The
Taiwan Youth later changed its name to Taiwan (Formosa). This reflected
the anti-colonial movement’s new agenda to awaken not only the elites,
but also the masses in order to make the movement more inclusive.
The magazine had published 14 issues by the time it was merged with
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Taiwan People’s Daily in 1922.

As its inaugural statement suggests, The Taiwan Youth took
an editorial stance of liberalism, which was supportive of ‘selfdetermination’, ‘equal rights bet ween men and women’, and
‘harmonious labour-capital relations’. As the flagship publication of the
Taiwan Parliament Movement, the first and longest-lasting nationalist
movement in colonial Taiwan, The Taiwan Youth also championed home
rule and liberal constitutionalism. It targeted highly educated readers
and claimed to introduce the most modern trends of thoughts in the
world. Many frequent contributors were in fact well-respected Japanese
liberal intellectuals, including Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961, Professor
of Economics and the Chair of Colonial Studies at the University of
Tokyo), Yamamoto Miono (1874-1941, Professor of Economics and
Colonial Studies at the University of Kyoto), and Lin’s mentor, Izumi
Akira (Professor of Political Science and Colonial Studies at Meiji
Law School) (Wang, 1991: 28).

The articles in the Taiwan Youth were not purely academic treatises,
but were rather news reports and op-eds. Many of them aimed
at making an impact in specific contexts in colonial Taiwan. It is
noteworthy that these texts were written under censorship pressures. The
Taiwan Youth was printed and published in Tokyo, then sent to readers
in Japan and Taiwan. The articles needed to pass a dual censorship
review enforced by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Tokyo and the
Governor-General of Taiwan (hereafter the GGT).

Adopting a strategy of internal reform, Lin made a significant effort
to avoid stepping on red lines imposed by the colonial authorities and,
not surprisingly, made compromises from time to time. For instance,
before the first issue of the Taiwan Youth, Lin visited the then-governorgeneral, Den Kenjirō (1885-1930), in Tokyo. During the meeting, Lin
asked Den to inscribe a motto in the inaugural issue and assured him
that the magazine aimed at ‘advancing Taiwan’s culture’ and would
not have ‘extreme’ articles criticising the colonial administration. Lin
also sent copies to the Tokyo branch of the GGT for review before
its publication in Taiwan. Repeatedly in Lin’s articles advocating for
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political reforms, he made it clear in both the opening remarks and
the conclusion that the he was merely a loyal subject who wished to
contribute to the prosperity and development of the Japanese Empire.
Such efforts, however, did not absolve the magazine from arbitrary
and strict censorship. For example, the circulation of Vol. 3 No. 3
(September, 1921) was entirely banned by the GGT, despite it having
passed the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ review. Ironically, the same
articles were accepted and published by two government organs. 3
Several articles in the following issues were removed, while at least
three other issues were entirely banned (Anonymous 1921).
2 Taiwan in the World: Taiwanese Nationalists’ Imagination
of Nation and Law
A The Moment: The ‘New Page’ of the World
In the editor’s statement in the inaugural issue of The Taiwan Youth,
Lin described a historical moment:
The unprecedented World War is now a history. Millions of people
shed their blood that flowed together into a river and many of them
turned into skeletons. Alas! It was such a calamity! Was it not the
greatest misfortune for all human beings? (Lin 1920)

However, Lin drew great hope from this unprecedented catastrophe.
He viewed it as a time of awakening. Mankind awoke from darkness
and brutality to enlightenment and justice, and progressed from an
‘egotistic, exclusive, dominating, animal life’ to a movement aiming
at a ‘co-existing, self-sacrificing culture which could enable mutual
compromises. Such an irresistible trend would manifest in many new
developments, such as ‘the establishment of the League of Nations,
the respect to national self-determination, the achievement of equal
rights between men and women, and the movement of coordination
between labour and capital’ (Lin 1920a: 1).
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Repeatedly, Lin reminded his readers that they needed to act during
this turning point in world history. He ascribed the causes of the First
World War to oligarchy on both domestic and international levels; the
world was like a wild jungle where the weak fell prey to the strong. The
ruthless competition between individuals as well as between countries
inevitably led to a catastrophic ending. However, after deep reflection
about the war could come a new spirit of a new age. It was a spirit that
embraced social solidarity, humanity, reforms, and equality between
all humans, free from discrimination due to race, ethnicity, class, or
gender (Lin 1922a: 1). Lin considered this trend a ‘turning point of
the fate of the human race’ from self-destruction to a ‘new civilization
of freedom and peace’ (Lin 1922c: 1).
In this new chapter of human history, the strong should perform
their civilised and holy mission, directed by humanity and justice. They
should bear in mind ‘the interests and the development of the weak’.
On the other hand, ‘the weak’ who, as Lin defined them, were ‘those
who had not become independent in the keenly competitive society’
and ‘those who had been politically or economically suppressed by the
privileged class and endured hardship in their lives’, also had their own
responsibilities. They should, in response to the new trends, awaken
and strive for emancipation.
Lin suggested that there had been various occasions when ‘the weak’
had already made their voices heard:
In the social problems between men and women, there are movements
for women’s liberation and suffrage. In the question of a fundamental
change in the economic structure, there have been proposals ranging
from negotiation between labour and capital, the improvement of
the status of the proletarians, and a fundamental abolishing of the
class system. In politics, with regard to Constitutionalism, there
are movements aiming at abolishing bureaucracy and stratocracy,
implementing democracy, and adopting universal suffrage. Between
nations, the example is the movement for national self-determination.
Internationally, there is a demand for securing independence and
justice. These are the demands made by the voices of the weak.
However, these demands are also based on humanity, justice, freedom,
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1920b: 31).

According to Lin, the new civilization was foreshadowed by past
movements of the ‘spirit of the people’. Some historical examples were
the independence of Poland (1918), the return of Alsace-Lorraine to
France (1918), and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1918)
in the aftermath of WWI. Lin also viewed more recent events, such as
‘the riot in India’ (the Chauri Chaura Incident of 1922), ‘the recognition
of the Republic of Ireland by the United Kingdom’ (the establishment
of the Republic of Ireland following a war of independence, 1922), and
‘the abolishment of protectorate in Egypt’ (the independence of Egypt,
1922) as signs of this growing trend (Lin 1922c:1).
Addressing Taiwanese readers at home and abroad, Lin’s reports
from Tokyo were a celebration of the internationalisation of nationalism.
The emerging nations from every corner of the world were suddenly and
simultaneously awakened and eager to seize the ‘Wilsonian moment’
(Manela, 2007). In Lin’s construction of ‘the moment,’ there was a
‘world,’ an imaginary entity in which all nations were connected. They
were connected not only by similar anti-colonial struggles, but also
by the sheer fact that they shared a simultaneous presence in a global
community. The people, be they Egyptian, Irish, or Indian, might never
meet each other, but they were all members of that world.

Anderson (1991) informs us how the ‘simultaneity’ shared by a
people in a territory with clear geographic and political boundaries
enables the imagination of nationalism. Lin’s passionate narrative of
the ‘new age’ constructed a worldwide simultaneity and represented
an imagined global community. Moreover, as I will illustrate, this
imagined world community was where Taiwan was to be born. This
image of the relation between Taiwan and the world was shared by Lin
and other Taiwanese nationalists who believed in a non-xenophobic,
internationalist form of nationalism that would be compatible with a
liberal understanding of rule of law.
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B Taiwan’s Debut: The Taiwanese People, The Japanese
Empire, and the World
Taiwan is more than the Taiwan that consists of three million and
five hundred thousand people ... Taiwan is more than the Taiwan
that constitutes a Japanese state … Taiwan is part of the world (Lin
1920c: 39).

At this turning point of world history entered the Taiwanese people.
Lin’s quotation above asserted three constitutive aspects of Taiwan:
Taiwan was not defined solely by its people or by its history as part of
the Japan state, but by its role as a part of the world.
At first glance, the existence of Taiwan and the Taiwanese people
seems rather ordinary, the former being ‘a part of the earth’ and the
latter being ‘a member of the human race’ (Lin 1922b: 1). Lin was
simply saying that the Taiwanese were just like any other people, be
they Indian, Irish, or Egyptian, or any others in the world. Such a plain
statement, however, was in fact significant and, for many Taiwanese,
heartfelt. Following the order in Lin’s statement, I will discuss its
significance by analysing, respectively, Taiwan’s relation to Taiwanese
people, Taiwan as part of Japan, and lastly, Taiwan as a member of
the world.

First, Lin’s statement was one of the earliest attempts to construct
the Taiwanese as a people (volk). By 1920, the 25 years of colonial rule
had given this geographical unit a clear political meaning. That is, the
island of Taiwan was a colony under the reign of the Japanese Empire.
As discussed in the previous discussion on Lin’s transformation from
a colonial subject into a cosmopolitan intellectual, many Taiwanese
elite shared common frustrations regarding the limited options within
and beyond the colony for their career paths. The colonial experience
contributed to the feeling of a shared predicament, a feeling that made
the imagination of Taiwanese nationalism possible.

In 1920, the very first article Lin wrote for The Taiwan Youth began
with a straightforward statement about the origin of his people: ‘3.5
million islanders living on the isolated island of Taiwan of 36,000
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square kilometers are part of the Han people who possess longlasting history of 4,000 years’ (Lin 1920b: 31). Similar statements
were repeated in several articles, including the petition for the abovementioned Taiwan colonial parliament to assert Taiwan’s subjectivity.

Second, Lin’s statement claimed that Taiwan was not merely a
colony of Japan, it was also owned by the Taiwanese people. Lin,
a moderate and liberal anti-colonial nationalist, recognised Japan’s
sovereignty over the island.4 Nevertheless, Lin rejected a view of
Taiwanese merely as subjects of either the Japanese Empire or of
the governor-general of Taiwan. In Lin’s proposal for the colonial
parliament, Taiwanese, along with the Japanese residents in Taiwan,
owned this island and should have a say in its governance. The previous
discussion regarding the movement for a Taiwan Parliament to consist
of members elected by the people was also along this line of thought.
Lin was not the only one and probably not the first to express such
a view. In his editorial announcing the inauguration of The Taiwan
Youth, Izumi Akira, Lin’s mentor-turned-ally in the Meiji Law School,
clearly asserted that ‘Taiwan is not the Taiwan of the governor-general
of Taiwan. It should be the Taiwan of the inhabitants of the island of
Taiwan’ (Izumi 1920: 5-7). Lin echoed his Japanese mentor. Despite
Lin’s narrative about the Taiwanese people and their history indicated
earlier, he advocated political rights, by the way of establishing a colonial
parliament, not merely for the Taiwanese, but rather for all residents,
including the Japanese, living in Taiwan (Lin 1921: 33).
The statement quoted at the beginning of this section is taken from
the inaugural issue of The Taiwan Youth. As Lin observed: ‘Taiwan is
more than the Taiwan that consists of three million and five hundred
thousand people ... Taiwan is more than the Taiwan that constitutes a
Japanese state … Taiwan is part of the world’. Later on, in an editorial
also published in The Taiwan Youth, Ts’ai Pei-ho, as a precursor to the
1920s-anticolonial movement, also said something similar: ‘Taiwan is
the Taiwan of the Empire. At the same time, Taiwan is the Taiwan of
we Taiwanese’ (Ts’ai 1920a: 35, 1920b: 19).
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In other words, while Taiwan was part of Japan, it was also ‘more
than’ that. It also belonged to its constitutive members – the people
living on the island. In this way, Lin was echoing Akira and Ts’ai in
advocating for ‘Taiwan-centered’ reforms, opposing a ‘Japan-centered’
policy, and claiming special political rights for the colonised people.
Lin did not stop here. He added a third idea: ‘Taiwan is part of
the world’ (Lin 1920b: 31). In the last part of the statement, Lin was
saying that Taiwan was not the exclusive possession of either the
Japanese or the Taiwanese. Rather, it was also ‘owned’ by the world.
If the statement that Taiwan was an island ‘consisting of 3.5 million
Taiwanese’ was an expression of (Taiwanese) nationalism, then ‘Taiwan
is part of the world’ conveyed the internationalist characteristics of
Taiwanese nationalism.

In the trilogy of ideas with which Lin constructed Taiwan’s identity,
the last statement is the one that is most relevant to our inquiry into
the liberal tendency in Taiwanese nationalists’ understanding of
law and politics. Indeed, the assertion that ‘Taiwan was part of the
world’ was a clear rejection of Japan’s domination. Taiwanese elites
in their limited journeys not only identified fellow Taiwanese, but
also discovered a Taiwan constrained by Japanese rule. Beyond the
authoritarian and discriminating colonial regime, there was a world
of equality and freedom, a world to which Taiwan, as a colony, did
not have direct access. Therefore, the idea of its inhabitants ‘being like
any other people,’ which was one aspect of being ‘a part of the world’
was a passionate proclamation, but it was a condition that Taiwanese
nationalists had not achieved.5

As mentioned earlier, in 1922 the name of The Taiwan Youth
magazine was changed to Taiwan (or Formosa). On this occasion, Lin
wrote a succinct chronicle of the Taiwanese people:
Taiwan is an isolated island in the corner of the Pacific Ocean. Since
the sixteenth century when the Portuguese called it ‘Formosa’ with
admiration, the island attracted Europeans’ attention.6 The occupation
by Dutch and the Spanish from 1624 began the development of its
rich natural resources. Then the three-generation Cheng dynasty
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consolidated the foundation of the Han-Chinese settlement. Next
was the 222-year rule of the Qing Empire, which opened up vast
uncultivated land in Taiwan. In 1895, the island was incorporated into
the territory of the Japanese Empire. There was no room for largescale immigration from their homeland Japan. … Because of such
a 300-years past, this isolated island became not only a focal point
of colonial competition but also a highway connecting Europe and
Asia. In the end, through a long period of natural selection, only the
Han-Chinese people obtained the name and the substance of being
Taiwanese (Lin 1922b: 1).

In this bird’s eye view of the three hundred years of Taiwan’s history,
Taiwan first emerged as an isolated island, but was nevertheless drawn
into the competition between several powers. Taiwan turned into a
focal point for colonial expansion as well as a ‘highway’ connecting
Europe and Asia. Through successive occupations, including the Dutch,
the Spanish, and then the neighbouring Chinese and Japanese, the
Han-people from China became ‘Taiwanese’ and emerged as a people/
nation in the world.
The Han-Chinese ethnicity of the Taiwanese is emphasised by Lin.
Yet he does not refer to the thousand-years-old cultural legacy of China.
Instead, he was talking about a specific experience of 300 years that
was exclusive to Han-Chinese immigrants in Taiwan, who survived
‘natural selection’ and became the only ones who can claim the title
of ‘Taiwanese’. In other words, what he emphasised was a distinctive
Han-Chinese Creole experience that not only distinguished between
Taiwanese and Japanese, but also between other ‘pan-Chinese’. It was
the story of how a particular group of people evolved from Han-Creole
into Taiwanese.7
C The Pursuit of a New Culture: Rule of Law as an AntiColonial Discourse
In the discourse of Taiwanese liberals, the ‘world’ did not merely refer
to a geographic or political space but also to a cultural space shared by
the ‘civilised’ peoples. The concept of ‘culture (bunka)’ referred equally
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to a specific set of customs, arts, and social institutions belonging to a
particular group of people as to the status of intellectual development
among such a people. The possession or lack of ‘culture’ could be
evaluated by a kind of universal spirit. Specifically, it was the liberally
oriented global ideals of the new age, such as self-determination and
constitutionalism, that Taiwanese liberals celebrated.

The cultural ‘world’ was a destination at which the Taiwanese had
not yet arrived. In the prospectus of The Taiwan Youth, an anonymous
author juxtaposed the youth in Taiwan with those in Japan and the
newly established Republic of China (1911-) (hereafter the ROC).
In contrast with the ‘pure idealism’, ‘fervent struggle’, and ‘vigorous
movement’ manifested by the awakened youth in homeland Japan and
in the ROC, the youth of Taiwan remained ‘silent and mute’ (Taiwan
Shiryō Hozonkai, 1969: 29). They were ‘unaware of the unfree situation
surrounding themselves’ and ‘indifferent to the trend of the world’. Ts’ai
Pei-ho also showed remorse for having been, as one of the Taiwanese,
‘numb’ and lacking in ‘enterprising spirit’.
Taiwan’s backwardness was one of Lin’s favourite topics. In contrast
with his optimistic account of world trends and his passionate assertion
of Taiwan’s existence in the world, Lin usually shifted to a sentimental
tone when describing the present situation of colonial Taiwan, a nation
that had been ‘secluded and cramped and was, therefore, falling behind
the cultural trend of the world’ (Lin 1920a: 1). Taiwan was described
as an island where ‘education was not yet popularised’ and the common
people were ‘benighted’ (Lin 1920b: 34-37). In his first Chinese
editorial in The Taiwan Youth, he reiterated the subject:
The majority of the people in Taiwan are not aware of living in an
environment without freedom. They are lacking in enterprising and
fighting spirit. On the top of that … they are sloppy, egoistic, and
easily tempted by even small amounts of money. Therefore, most of
them are disinterested and turned a deaf ear to the changing general
trend of the times. However, since the new culture is moving full speed
forward every single minute, Taiwanese are constantly falling further
and further behind (Lin 1920b: 31).
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While Lin was certainly proud of the Chinese heritage in Taiwan
and regarded it as a distinctive feature differentiating the Taiwanese
from the Japanese, he also attributed Taiwan’s backwardness, in part
at least, to the negative side of the Chinese culture. According to
Lin, the Han-Chinese people had a bad reputation of ‘toadyism’ and
a ‘dependent mentality’, They were in the habit of relying on others
and had the tendency to ‘curry favor with the strong’. Having become
part of the culture in Taiwan, these bad characteristics and habits of
the Han-Chinese people were the opposite of the spirit of self-reliance
and should be uprooted (Lin 1920b: 37). In other words, the Chinese
tradition in Taiwan was not exempt from scrutiny. For Lin, the negative
side, such as the ‘dependent mentality’ of Chinese culture was an
obstacle to the healthy development of the Taiwanese and needed to
be eradicated (Lin 1920b: 37).
It is not difficult to see the source for Lin’s image of the Taiwanese
people as reactionary and backward. As I mentioned earlier, the
Japanese reporter who covered Lin’s success in passing the civil
service exam did not shy away from characterising the Taiwanese as
reactionary and stubborn. The notion of ‘advanced Japanese versus
backward Taiwanese’ was in fact omnipresent in colonial governance.
Goto Shinpei (1857-1929), a civil administrator of Taiwan (1898-1906),
denominated his own philosophy of colonial governance as a ‘politics
of biology,’ which could be exemplified by his famous metaphor about
flounders and sea breams:
The eyes of f lounders are on one side of their heads. Although
flounders look ridiculous, we cannot change flounders into sea breams
by relocating each of the eyes onto two sides of their heads. There is
a biological necessity that the eyes of a flounder are on one side of its
head … this is also true in policy (Gotō Shinpei Tsutōki Hensanksi
1937: 399).

In Goto’s politics of biology, the difference between the two people
was analogous to the difference between two fishes. The flounder
referred to the Taiwanese, the sea bream to the Japanese. They were not
only different, but were situated in a hierarchical structure. The fish-
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loving Japanese valued sea breams greatly: they were served in sacred
ceremonies since ancient times. Flounders not only looked ‘ridiculous’
but were often found struggling in the mud.

From the very beginning of colonial rule, whether or not the
Constitution of the Empire of Japan (1889) should be applied to Taiwan
had been a controversial issue in both the Imperial Diet and in legal
academia (Wang 1997: 183; 190). Speaking on behalf of the colonial
government, Goto claimed that the ‘crude and childish’ Taiwanese were
not able to appreciate the laws of civilised countries. To teach Taiwanese
the concept of right was to imbue strange thoughts into a primitive
people. In the worst-case scenario, the ideas in modern law might evoke
the natives’ resistance toward the government. Goto concluded that it
was improper to apply Japanese laws to Taiwanese for the time being.
The ideal model would be delegating to the governor-general extensive
legislative power to make laws suitable to the particular circumstances
of the colony (Oguma 1998: 132-133; Tsurumi 1937: 916).

Governor-General Den Kenjiro also adopted an evolutionary
theory about colonial governance. In his report to the Diet in 1920,
Den asserted that the Taiwanese were not yet ‘civilised’ enough to
receive a Japanese-style constitution and laws (Taiwan Sōtokufu Kanbō
Shingishitsu 1940: 62; 68-69; 74; 130-131; Wang 2010: 203). In the
same year, a Japanese political commentator named Iwazaki Ketsuji
claimed that, although the 25 years of Japanese colonial rule had raised
the ‘cultural level’ in Taiwan to a certain extent, people in Taiwan
remained under the influence of the 300 years of imperial Chinese rule.8
Therefore, Iwazaki continued, a rash assimilation caused by extending
Japanese law indiscriminately to Taiwan, would be not only unnatural
but also detrimental (Taiwan Sōtokufu Kanbō Shingishitsu 1940: 146147). He praised special legislations and measures in Taiwan, such as
flogging, and a simplified criminal procedure that permitted police to
adjudicate misdemeanors.
In other words, Taiwanese political power would not be granted
unless the people’s cultural level attained a standard deemed satisfactory
by Japanese rulers. In the 1920s, they deemed the Taiwanese still too
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backward to either enact their own laws or to use the laws designed
for the Japanese.

On first glance, Lin seemed to merely accept popular colonial
discourse regarding the Taiwanese as low on the ‘civilisation ladder.’
However, if we take a closer look at the ways in which Lin characterised
Taiwan and positioned it in the world, Lin’s self-criticism was more
complex. According to Lin, Taiwan existed at ‘the crossroad between
Europe and Asia’ but was also ‘isolated in the remote corner of the
world’ (Lin 1922b: 1). It was a nation that possessed great history
but was now ‘falling behind’ (Lin 1920a: 1). Moreover, as if these
characterisations were not oxymoronic enough, Lin claimed that the
inhabitants of the island of Taiwan were people who were ‘endowed
with age-old culture’. At the same time, the Taiwanese was also a people
who were ‘culturally undeveloped’ (Lin 1920b: 35).

These pairs of opposing characterisations can be only understood
through a highly contextual analysis. I argue that Lin’s implication of
‘duplicity’ regarding Taiwan’s status in the world was twofold. First,
Lin’s juxtaposition of the past versus the present, the island’s cultural
legacy versus its current barrenness, and the fast-moving world trends
versus the sleeping Taiwanese, was an attempt to remind Taiwanese
of their own cultural greatness. It was a way to conjure the Taiwanese
people from their hidden corner to fulfil their mission as members of
the world.
As mentioned earlier, Lin ascribed the Taiwanese people’s lack of
power to their suppression by the privileged, but he also asked ‘the weak’
to take responsibility for themselves; that meant to wake up in response
to the ‘trend of the world’ and strive for their own emancipation (Lin
1920b: 31). For Taiwanese liberal nationalists, the ability to understand
and to live up to such ideals was requisite for building a nation. They
believed that if one was ignorant of the meaning and values of the
new age, s/he was ‘not worthy of being a human being, not to mention
being a nation/people’ (Lin 1920a: 1). If a nation lacked the spirit of
self-reliance, its people were then ‘an unnatural and abnormal people
who should not be allowed to exist in the new age and new world’ (Lin
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1920d: 1). In other words, ‘being part of the world’ was inseparable
from ‘being a nation’ in the liberal nationalist scheme (Lin 1920b: 35).
Lin’s negative self-portrait was, therefore, as much a self-criticism
as it was about other-imposed captivity. Lin’s dual characterisation of
Taiwan suggested that Taiwan’s backwardness could not be simply
attributed to certain inherent defects. Rather, it was a consequence of
unfortunate historical processes; in particular Japan’s outdated colonial
policy, which suppressed the cultural development of the Taiwanese, a
people with great history and culture, by depriving them of their chance
to cultivate themselves into an independent and self-reliant nation in
a self-ruled civic society.
According to Lin, until the 1920s Japanese colonial policy in
Taiwan had focused on economic development but had neglected the
development of culture:
At first, it [Taiwan] was governed under the guideline of economism,
which centered on investing in industries, improving agriculture, and
utilising labour. Lately, however, we can see that an age of culturalism
is dawning … Being used to the conventional, conservative, restrained
life of the materialistic world for years, Taiwanese have yet to absorb
the culture and way of thinking of creativity, progressiveness, and
freedom. I can’t help feeling forlorn when I think of such a situation
(Lin 1922b: 1).

Lin also criticised Japanese colonisers for regarding Taiwan merely
as a conquered land and simplifying Taiwanese education to be merely
capable of producing low-tech labourers. Such an education offered
basic skills but no training for independent or critical thinking. As a
consequence, people could think of nothing but satisfying their own
materialistic desires (Lin 1920b: 34-35). Such one-sided progress was
therefore a ‘limping progress’. Without a spiritual life, ‘What is the
difference between human-beings and farm cattle?’ (Lin 1920b: 29-30).

Even more boldly, Lin’s opening remarks in the second issue of
Taiwan Youth, entitled Cultivation of the Capacity of Self-Government,
accused the colonial authority of depriving Taiwanese of the
opportunity to cultivate themselves in the capacity of self-governance.
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The dictatorial rule of the military officer, the high-handed ‘police state’
(Polizeistaat), and the absence of constitutional governance resulted in
the lack of a sense of civic responsibility in Taiwan. The Taiwanese
became a people who were ‘incapable of self-reliance in the society,
merely subjects of the state, and falling behind in the human world’
(Lin 1920d: 1).
In other words, in response to the colonial discourse that refused
political rights to the Taiwanese, who were said to be unsuited to
modern constitutionalism, Lin gave the colonisers tit for tat by
manoeuvring the binary concepts of ‘civilised versus uncivilised’.
For him, Taiwan’s backwardness was neither inherent nor should
be perpetuated. He criticised the colonial policy for not meeting the
standard of ‘civilised’ colonial governance and demanded instead a
liberal colonial rule in which the colonised were able to exercise political
rights in order to cultivate themselves into self-reliant and progressive
people in the world (Lin 1920d:1).

For Lin, the rule of law was an essential part of the new culture.
In an editorial entitled ‘Advancing the Rule of Law in Taiwan’, he
distinguished ‘rule of law’ from Legalism in ancient China. Without
democratic participation in the legislative process and proper protection
of fundamental rights, Lin asserted, the sheer existence of laws and
statutes, no matter how abundant they are, cannot create a modern
political system (Lin 1922d:1).
Lin spoke even more baldly in his statement in the trial mentioned
earlier. He criticised the absence of constitutionalism and the
representative system in Taiwan as obstacles to Japan’s goal of creating
a genuinely ‘civilised country’:
Japan is a civilised country in the world. For the sake of the further
improvement of Japan’s status in the world, the uncivilised despotism
[in Taiwan] should be abolished. The spirit of colonial governance
after the war was meant to achieve the glorious mission of creating
a civilised country. We, as members of Japan, should have the right
and obligation to work together [to carry on such a mission] (Taiwan
People’s Daily, September 1, 1924).
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Lin capitalised on Japan’s anxiety at being a late-blooming ‘civilised
country’ with the desire to prove itself as a qualified example of the
colonial powers. He argued that the adoption of a representative
democracy in the colony would determine whether Japan, ‘the only
Oriental colonial country in the world’, could succeed in its governance
of its new territory and therefore ‘glorify the history of civilisation’
(Lin 1920e: 31).
3 Conclusion: Rule of Law in Post-Colonial Taiwan
As the counter-product of Japanese colonialism, anti-colonial
Taiwanese nationalism simultaneously accepted and refuted the
characteristics imposed by the colonisers. Lin’s editorial remarks to his
fellow Taiwanese youth reveal an internal and sometimes sentimental
view about Taiwanese nationalism and its mission. He imagined a
Taiwanese people who were full of potential but at the same time were
suppressed by an outdated colonial rule. Despite recognising Chinese
culture as a constitutive element of Taiwanese-ness, he did not regard
either the Chinese or Taiwanese civilisations as self-contained cultural
worlds. Instead, the liberal, progressive, and internationalist orientation
went hand-in-hand with the nationalists’ struggle to move beyond the
constraints of Japanese colonialism. In this nationalist discourse, liberal
constitutionalism, which asserted, among many other things, that
laws should be made though a democratic process that would protect
individual rights, was said to be the prerequisite for a nation to become
a member of the world. In so-called ‘oriental colonialism’ (Wu 2003),
in which the coloniser and the colonised shared cultural and ethical
proximity, it was harder for the colonised to claim distinctive nationalist
characteristic by appealing to tradition, be it cultural, religious, or
historical. Meanwhile, this particular anti-colonial structure granted
leeway for the natives to either accept cultural universalism or to ally
with the West to overcome the regional empire.
Although this article does not cover developments after WWII,
it is worth mentioning the similar tendency in postwar Taiwanese
nationalists of not deploying orthodox Confucian values to forge an
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indigenous Taiwanese identity against the incoming KMT regime.
Instead, liberal political traditions, including rule of law, were the
common values shared by the post-war Taiwanese nationalists.
After the Second World War, the Chinese Nationalist Party
(aka KMT) government took control of Taiwan. The liberal and
cosmopolitan character of Taiwanese nationalism remained; if
anything, it became even stronger. The KMT Chinese nationalists
adopted a similar approach to justify their authoritarian rule in Taiwan.
Initially, KMT government decided that the Taiwanese, who had been
‘enslaved’ under the Japanese authoritarian regime, were unsuitable for
Chinese constitutionalism. The KMT later brought its constitution to
Taiwan when it retreated from China in 1949 but issued a Martial Law
Decree that ‘froze’ the essential part of the constitution.

As I mentioned at the beginning of this article, leaders in Singapore
see good reason to manoeuvre Confucianism in constructing a unique
Asian or Chinese form of governance. In contrast, the post-war
anti-KMT Taiwanese nationalists are never enthusiastic about this
approach. In the 1980s political movement that shattered KMT’s
dictatorship, the normalisation of the constitution was the main
demand. As recently as March 2014, when the Taiwanese students
occupied the Parliament to protest against a trade pact with China,
rule of law was once again the key point of contention. The protesters,
consisting of students and civil rights groups, claimed that they were
not against the treaty with China per se, but rather insisted that such
an agreement should be reviewed and signed with due process and
democratic participation. Interestingly, President Ma Ying-Jeou, who
is also the chairman of ruling party, the KMT, stressed rule of law, or,
more precisely, rule by law, in response to the movement. He criticised
the occupation as being illegal and therefore detrimental to the rule of
law and to democracy, which he claimed, are the core values in Taiwan
(Anonymous 2014).
Another theme that continued after World War II is the Taiwanese’s
feeling of constraint and their desire to ‘join the world’. In the KMT
regime under Chiang Kai-Shek and Chiang Chin-Kuo, Taiwanese
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were again systemically discriminated against. Until the late 1980s,
the majority of important positions in both the government and the
KMT were reserved for the so-called Mainlanders (waishengren) who
immigrated from China to Taiwan right after World War II with the
defeated KMT. It is arguable that the KMT is another colonial regime
in its early days in Taiwan (Jacobs 2013: 573-575).

The sentiment of exclusion does not stop at the domestic level. In
the early 1970s, Taiwan was expelled from the U.N. when the People’s
Republic of China replaced the KMT-led Republic of China in Taiwan
as the rightful representative of China and one of the five permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council. Over the years, Taiwan has
applied for U.N. membership but repeatedly encountered opposition
from China, which claims sovereignty over Taiwan despite the fact
that the PRC never ruled Taiwan. Many Taiwanese see themselves as
a people being systematically excluded from the international society.
In a documentary called ‘Dear Taiwan’ (2011), Feng Qiao-Lan, a
Taiwanese NGO activist, said sentimentally: ‘The issue of national
identity made us suffer more than others. … But we are also very
fortunate that perhaps with our own hands we will bring this country
into the world’. In other words, Lin’s remarks in the 1920s speak
powerfully to the present. Almost a century later, being recognised as
members of the world is still an unfulfilled dream for the Taiwanese
people; so too is the pursuit of a genuine rule of law.
Notes
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Lin’s transcript in Meiji Law School. Courtesy of courtesy of Lin’s greatgrandson, Lin Zhong-Guang.
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Despite sharing a family name, Lin Hsien-Tang was not a relative of Lin
Cheng-Lu.

According to the preface, the two government organs which accepted
this article is Tainan News (Taiwan Shin Po) and Taiwan News (Taiwan
Shinbun). Also, several issues of The Taiwan Youth were banned ( including
1/4 October, 1920; 3/6 December, 1921; 4/1 January, 1922; 4/2 February,
1922).
The Taiwanese liberal nationalists never openly advocated for
independence, let alone armed resistance. Their petitions for a Taiwanese
parliament emphasized that the island would remain under the Imperial
Diet’s legislative authority for matters pertaining to all territories within
the Japanese Empire and that a Taiwanese parliament was comparable to
universal suffrage that was being advocated at the same time in Japan. It
is understandable that the emerging Taiwanese Marxists would view the
liberal nationalists as a group of pampered sons from wealthy families,
who were cowardly and out of touch with the general public’s needs and
concerns. On the other front, the colonial government never ceased
charging the liberal nationalists for advocating a ‘secessionist goal’, despite
all their efforts to present themselves as mild reformers, who advocating
for rights laid out in the Meiji Constitutionalism.
As for now in 2014, Taiwan is not a member in many international
organizations, such as the United Nations and World Health Organisation.

Ilha Formosa, literally meaning ‘Beautiful Island’, is a name given to
Taiwan island by passing Portuguese mariners in 1554.
Anderson discusses about European creole (Anderson 1991: 47-67).

Note that the Qing-rule in Taiwan is only 212 years (from 1683-1895).
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